Scientific Evidence: The Nebraska Game and Parks Commission Explores New Blood and Tissue Identification Techniques for Game Law Enforcement by Pharris, John W.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 4 Article 10
1978
Scientific Evidence: The Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission Explores New Blood and Tissue
Identification Techniques for Game Law
Enforcement
John W. Pharris
University of Nebraska College of Law, john@pharrislaw.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John W. Pharris, Scientific Evidence: The Nebraska Game and Parks Commission Explores New Blood and Tissue Identification Techniques
for Game Law Enforcement, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 1062 (1978)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol57/iss4/10
Comment
Scientific Evidence: The Nebraska
Game and Parks Commission




In recent years, tremendous advances have been made in the
area of scientific technology. It is not surprising that as scientific
technology improves, law enforcement agencies attempt to make
use of newly available scientific information to aid them in de-
tecting and preventing the violation of laws. "Enforcement agen-
cies, both public and private, have been applying new devices and
theories of a scientific nature in an effort to stem the rising crime
rate."' A large amount of the scientific technology used in this
area involves the use of chemical, electrical, and mechanical
processes to assist law enforcement officers in their jobs.2
Through the years, the courts have come to recognize the value
of scientific evidence in the law enforcement area. However, de-
spite this recognition of the potential value of scientific informa-
tion, courts have, in general, been very cautious in admitting
scientific data into evidence and do so only in strict accordance
with the long established rules of evidence. It is because of this
procedural caution that a spectrum of admissible and inadmissible
scientific test results has developed in this country. At one end of
the spectrum are scientific methods that have become so widely
recognized by the courts that judicial notice is taken of their relia-
bility, for example, fingerprint evidence. 3 On the other end of the
spectrum are tests such as "truth-serum" or hypnosis which alleg-
edly determine the truthfulness of a person's statements, and
1. Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH
L. REV. 313, 313 (1963-1964).
2. See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN Scmrm Ic EVIDENCE 10-14 (2d ed. 1974).
3. See generally A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, SciENTTFic EVIDENCE IN
CauMINAL CASES, 306-47 (1973).
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which few courts have considered reliable enough for courtroom
use.4 Between these two extremes are tests like the polygraph
(lie detector) technique. Many specialists advocate judicial ap-
proval of lie detector tests yet many psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists oppose their use. Consequently, at the present time, general
admissibility has been denied to polygraph results. 5
The Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Commission), like other law enforcement agencies,
has made an extensive effort to keep abreast of the scientific ad-
vances which might aid it in carrying out its duty of game law en-
forcement. In 1968, the Commission began studying and
experimenting with the identification of blood and tissue samples
for game law enforcement purposes. Its primary objective was to
develop a scientific testing procedure for identification of un-
known blood or tissue samples from various animal species.
These identifications would greatly aid the Commission in deter-
mining whether a suspected game law violator had in fact taken
game animals illegally. After considerable study and experimen-
tation, the Commission was able to develop two scientific identifi-
cation techniques by which blood and tissue samples could, in a
manner of speaking, be "fingerprinted." These "fingerprints"
could then be compared with the "fingerprints" of blood and tissue
samples from known animal species in order to identify the partic-
ular animal species from which the unknown blood or tissue sam-
ple had originated. These identification techniques were
developed by adapting two generally known, but not widely used,
scientific testing processes to the game law enforcement area.
The two testing processes are called nim unodiffusion and immu-
noelectrophoresis.
In the past few years, the Commission has performed approxi-
mately twenty-five identifications a year with its new scientific
identification techniques. Of these identifications, about four or
five have been used in a court of law each year.6 The surprising
fact is that the admissibility of the testing results as valid evidence
has yet to be challenged by a defense attorney in a Nebraska court.
This fact has caused the Commission some concern. It is confi-
dent that its scientific identification results are credible and relia-
ble. However, the Commission is unsure exactly what it must be
able to show in order to prove reliability when, as is inevitable, it is
eventually put to the task by an aggressive defense attorney.
4. Id. at 565-77.
5. Id. at 539-64.
6. D. OATEs, C. BROWN & D. WEIGEL, BLOOD AND TISSUE IDENTIFICATION, pt. 1, A-5
(Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n 1974).
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The purpose of this article is threefold. First, to explain the
historical background, general principles and mechanical
processes upon which the Commission's scientific identification
methods are based. Second, to examine the standards by which
scientific evidence in general must be measured in determining its
admissibility in a court of law. And finally, to formulate an opin-
ion based on general legal standards and Nebraska law as to the
evidentiary status in Nebraska of the Commission's scientific iden-
tification methods.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SCIENTIFIC
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANICAL PROCESSES
"The discovery that human beings could be identified as indi-
viduals by means of their fingerprints started research in a broad
field that now encompasses the forensic sciences."'7 The major ad-
vances that have been made in the field of forensic science since
fingerprinting have caused many forensic experts to believe that
all items of the universe are in some respect different from all
other similar items. This belief has led two eminent forensic
scientists to state:
If all similar physical objects are in some respect different from each
other, blood should be no exception, be it liquid or dried, in a bottle or as a
dry spot on the floor, on the clothing, or on the furniture at the scene of
the crime. . . If blood could be individualized with precision, blood
would rank with fingerprints in importance.8
The key to individualizing blood was early thought to be in the
study of its protein structures. Years of study and research con-
firmed these beliefs to the extent that, today, the central dogma of
molecular biology is that protein differences exist between differ-
ent animal species and, in a much more intricate and complicated
manner, between individuals within the same animal species.9
In 1901, the German scientist, P. Uhlenhuth, first dpmonstrated
that due to the protein differences existing between animal spe-
cies, an unknown blood sample could be identified as coming from
a human or an animal.10 Uhlenhuth's scientific identification
technique, the precipitin test, had the capacity to identify blood on
test objects consisting of wood, metal, and cloth. The test's results
were first used as legal evidence in a 1902 French murder trial in
which it was shown that the blood stains on the defendant's cloth-
7. Kirk & Grunbaum, Individuality of Blood and Its Forensic Significance, 1969
LEG. MED. ANN. 289, 289.
8. Id. at 289-90.
9. See C. MARwELL, MOLE CuLAR BIOLOGY AND THE ORIGnG OF THE SPECrES 394
(1970).
10. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 11. Uhlenhuth achieved this by using immu-
nological principles developed by Bordet in 1898.
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ing were human blood, and not rabbit blood as the defendant had
claimed." It is important to note that the precipitin test can also
be used to identify the specific non-human animal species which is
the source of an unknown sample of blood. This is done by pre-
paring antiserum from the blood serum of various animals in a
manner similar to the preparation of antiserum from human blood
serum.12
For the forty years following Uhlenhuth's development of the
precipitin test, the technique was rarely used in the United States.
It was, however, extensively employed in India and Europe for
criminal cases and in tests for meat adulteration.13 Originally, the
precipitin test was thought to be specific in its results but it was
soon discovered that related species of animals caused cross reac-
tions and false identification of blood in some cases. For example,
anti-human serum was found to react to some extent with the
blood of other primates such as chimpanzees and gorillas, yielding
false identifications of the blood as that of a human.14 The precipi-
tin test has also proved inadequate to differentiate between cer-
tain related species such as horses and mules or goats and sheep.' 5
Very little information has been published on blood and meat
identification of game animals for forensic purposes. However, it is
11. The complexities of the precipitin test are somewhat involved, but the follow-
ing basic explanation of the test should help the reader to understand at least
its mechanics:
The questioned blood sample is dissolved in a saline solution and
centrifuged to clearness. The serum is then drawn off and carefully
placed into a separate test tube containing antiserum from a rabbit
injected with known human blood. The appearance-of a white or
gray precipitate ring between the suspect serum and known antise-
rum within five minutes, and the precipitation of this white or gray
flock over the succeeding 15 to 20 minutes, are indicative of the
blood's human origin. If no precipitate at all appears within 20 min-
utes, the result is negative, that is, the specimen of blood is not of
human origin.
The human antiserum obtained from the rabbit is produced by
injecting the rabbit with foreign protein in the form of several centi-
meters of sterile human serum on each of several intervening occa-
sions. The blood serum of the rabbit reacts to the injected foreign
human serum by forming antibodies to combat the foreign human
serum. These antibodies formed by the rabbit are drawn off by nee-
die and constitute the antiserum used in the precipitin test. Antise-
rum from a rabbit innoculated with human serum will react only
with the serum from human blood to form a precipitate. Antiserum
from rabbits is produced commercially for use in serological tests.
A. MOENSSENS, R. MOsES & F. INAU, supra note 3, at 253-54.
12. See note 11 supra.
13. See Wolfe, Factors Which May Modify Precipitin Tests in Their Applications
to Zoology and Medicine, 6 PH-siori. ZooL 55, 56 (1933).
14. A. MOENSSENS, R. MosEs & F. INBAu, supra note 3, at 252 n.23.
15. Id. at 254.
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known that one of the greatest breakthroughs in game law enforce-
ment occurred in California where, for the first time in this coun-
try, a person was convicted with evidence based wholly upon the
precipitin test and its ability to differentiate venison from beef,
mutton, and bear meat.16
Due to the false identification problems engendered in the pre-
cipitin test, scientists began to search for more accurate and pre-
cise testing methods to identify the species origin of unknown
blood samples. Immunodiffusion precipitin techniques were de-
veloped independently in Sweden and England in 1948.17 A few
years later, in 1953, immunoelectrophoresis precipitin techniques
were developed in the United States.18 In recent years, these new
approaches to the problem of identifying blood through detection
of hereditary differences in the blood proteins have developed at a
remarkable rate. Of all the methods derived for separating and
identifying protein fractions, no method has more potential than
procedures based on electrophoretic separation.' 9 "By any crite-
rion, electrophoresis and immunoelectrophoresis, when combined
with conventional blood grouping, offer the most comprehensive,
practical, and rapid approach to the individualization of blood that
is available at this time.' '20 Indeed, scientists have been led to
comment that the increased specificity of immunoelectrophoresis
in separating the blood proteins is the nearest to a "fingerprint"
technique for blood that has yet been developed.2 '
Despite the tremendous scientific advancements that have
been made in the area of "fingerprinting" blood, immunodiffusion
and immunoelectrophoresis have not been widely used to solve fo-
rensic problems. A recent survey of selected criminalistics labora-
tories within the United States has shown that only limited use is
currently being made of available technology in immunological
and electrophoretic analysis of blood.22 There are two major rea-
sons for such limited use. First, the techniques are not yet simple,
rapid, or inexpensive enough. Second, many law enforcement
agencies lack the trained personnel, laboratory space, funds, or
time to use the new techniques.
Despite the limited use of available technology in immunologi-
cal and electrophoretic analysis of human blood and tissue, the
Commission decided to explore the possibility of using the tech-
16. See. Wolfe, supra note 13, at 56.
17. See D. OATES, C. BROWN & D. WEIGEL, supra note 6, at 8.
18. Id.
19. See Kirk & Grunbaum, supra note 7, at 300.
20. Id. at 309.
21. Id. at 312.
22. See Grunbaum, Electrophoresis in Forensic Applications, INDusTlLAL RE-
SEARCH, Nov. 15, 1977, at 13.
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niques in the game law enforcement area. During the 1960's, the
Commission had come to realize that it was in acute need of an
accurate scientific technique for identifying the animal species ori-
gin of blood and tissue samples. It was obvious that without such
a technique, the Commission would not be able to properly enforce
the state's game laws. The Commission had used the precipitin
test with some success, but it was extremely slow and awkward to
run. Additionally, the test results were often unreliable because
they were subject to myriad interpretations. For these reasons, in
1968 the Commission's Research Division initiated a research pro-
ject to develop an improved scientific technique of identifying
blood and tissue samples for game law enforcement purposes.23
The project produced somewhat unique immunodiffusion and im-
munoelectrophoretic techniques for identifying the animal species
origin of blood and tissue samples. Because the Commission's
two scientific identification techniques are somewhat complicated,
a basic understanding of how they operate is necessary in order to
fully examine the admissibility of their results into evidence in a
court of law.
A. Immunodiffusion
A glass slide is prepared with three spots containing a mixture
of blood from the unknown animal species and three spots filled
with a similar solution made from the blood of a known animal
species. The spots form a circular pattern and are alternated so
that one spot contains the known blood and the next contains the
unknown blood. An antiserum produced by injecting blood from
the known species into a rabbit is then added to the center of the
slide in the middle of the circle of blood spots. As the antibodies
contained in the antiserum come into contact with the proteins of
the unknown and known blood solutions, a precipitate band is
formed. These bands constitute what has been referred to as a
"fingerprint" of the proteins contained in the blood samples. If
23. The research was initiated by Mr. Carl Wolfe, Senior Biologist in the Com-
mission's Research Division and was financially supported by funds from the
Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (1976), under
Pittman-Robertson Project W-38-R and by general funds from the Commis-
sion itself. In his research, Mr. Wolfe enlisted the assistance of Carl R. Jol-
liff, Director of the Clinical Laboratory of Lincoln; Dr. Connell L. Marsh,
Professor of Biochemistry, University of Nebraska; Dr. Leonard W. Staud-
inger, Biology Department Chairman, Nebraska Wesleyan University; Dr.
Stan Cassel D.V.M.- and Mr. David W. Oates, Senior Chemist in the Commis-
sion's Research Division. D. OATEs, C. BROWN & D. WEIGEL, supra note 6, at
3. Additionally, since it was impossible to purchase the necessary scientific
equipment from commercial sources, Mr. Wolfe sought the aid of a group of
private Lincoln industries to develop the equipment.
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the unknown blood solution contains exactly the same proteins as
those in the blood of the known animal species, the bands will
form a hexagon. Since no two separate animal species have ex-
actly the same proteins in their blood, the occurrence of a hexagon
pattern signals that the unknown animal blood has come from the
same animal species as that of the known species.
If the blood from the unknown animal is not the same as that of
the known species, then a triangular pattern will appear on the
slide. The test must, therefore, be repeated using different blood
taken from other known animal species, e.g., cattle, antelope, etc.,
until a hexagon pattern is finally achieved, resulting in a positive
identification.
B. Immunoelectrophoresis
Instead of the six test areas, this method involves the division
of the slide in half, with a trough in the middle. The unknown and
known blood samples are then mixed into separate saline solu-
tions and placed on opposite sides of the trough. The slide is
placed in a chamber in which electric current is then passed
through the substances. The current causes the proteins of the
samples to migrate toward the poles of the current. An antiserum,
produced in the same manner as described above, is then added to
the trough in the middle of the slide. After twenty-four hours, the
antibodies in the antiserum combine with the electrically-diffused
proteins of the blood samples to form a distinct pattern of arcs.
Again, if the unknown animal blood contains exactly the same pro-
teins as the blood from the known animal species, the precipitate
arcs on the right side of the trough will be exactly the same as the
precipitate arcs on the left side. Because no two separate animal
species have exactly the same proteins in their blood, the occur-
rence of mirror image precipitin arcs indicates that a positive iden-
tification has been made. If the arcs do not match, the test will be
repeated using different known animal blood until a mirror image
is achieved, thereby identifying the unknown blood.
When a positive identification has been made by either the im-
munodiffusion or immunoelectrophoresis method, the evidence
may be prepared in a number of ways in order to aid in the prose-
cution of a game violator. After the slides have been clearly
tagged to assure proper identification, they may be photographed.
Alternatively, the slide itself may be coated with a protective cov-
ering which will make it permanent for filing and future use
outside the laboratory. An advantage of preparing the slide in this
manner is that it may be used in an overhead projector if presenta-
tions must be made to large groups such as juries.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Although these two scientific techniques have been analogized
to fingerprinting techniques, this is somewhat inapt. Unlike fin-
gerprinting, the blood testing techniques have not yet been refined
to a point at which they can be used to identify a particular individ-
ual within a species. Presently, it is only possible to determine
the species of the animal. However, this is not regarded as a criti-
cal defect in the two scientific techniques. For the purpose of
game law enforcement, it is sufficient that the identification tech-
niques allow the Commission to identify the species. Once identi-
fied, the proper legal action can be instituted according to the
penalties set down for the type of animal found in the hunter's Me-
gal possession.
I.
STANDARDS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
In arriving at conclusions concerning the material elements of a
case, the trier of fact uses two types of propositions, specific and
general.24 The sources of these propositions depend upon the
type of evidence involved. When "ordinary evidence," as distin-
guished from scientific evidence, is used, the specific propositions
are derived from witnesses' statements concerning what they re-
member or from the trier of fact's own perceptions. 25 The general
propositions are obtained from the trier's general everyday knowl-
edge and experience. 2 6 In the case of scientific evidence, science
may provide the trier of fact with specific propositions which
neither the witnesses nor trier of fact could have obtained by way
of their unaided or uninformed sensory perceptions.2 7 Wigmore
noted this when he stated that scientific devices now produce pre-
cise minute data, perception of which was formerly beyond imagi-
nation.28 Science may also provide the trier of fact with general
propositions which are not the product of general everyday knowl-
edge and experience. 2 9 These general propositions may then be
applied to specific scientific propositions to show how data, which
otherwise is meaningless to the trier of fact, has a bearing upon the
issues of the case.
Most scientific evidence is like circumstantial evidence because
it does not directly address itself to legal issues and facts. Conse-
24. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALF. I REV. 689, 696 (1941).
25. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 2 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 417b (3d ed. 1940).
29. Strong, supra note 25, at 3.
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quently, like circumstantial evidence, it must be determined that
the offered scientific evidence is reliable and has some logical rela-
tionship to the legally determinative facts of the case before it is
admissible.30 With ordinary circumstantial evidence, this deter-
mination is left to the trier of fact.31 With scientific evidence,
some unique problems are encountered in attempting to make the
above determination.
Where scientific evidence is involved, however, the trier of fact often
cannot realistically be viewed as possessing the capacity to evaluate the
reliability of specific data gathered by scientific means, to supply a gen-
eral proposition by which the significance of the data may be seen, or to
apply such a proposition correctly. Therefore, various requirements
which must be met before scientific evidence is admitted should be, and
largely are, designed to compensate for these inadequacies of the trier
of fact.3
2
The requirements that must be met before scientific evidence is
admissible in court consist of a series of general tests and proce-
dures. The particular admissibility tests and procedures to be
used on a specific piece of scientific evidence depend upon
whether the evidence is a general proposition of science or a spe-
cific proposition obtained by scientific techniques. Consequently,
a court must initially categorize the scientific evidence sought to
be admitted as a general or a specific proposition before it can be-
gin to apply the proper admissibility tests and procedures. Addi-
tionally, it must be remembered that one function of scientific
evidence is to supply general propositions of science which, when
applied to specific scientific propositions, show how the seemingly
meaningless specific data has a bearing upon the issues in the
case.33 'Thus, a line of proof directed at the establishment of a
material fact may involve both specific data scientifically obtained
and general propositions of science which reveal the significance
of that data for the litigation at hand."3 4
This appears to be the situation with immunodiffusion and im-
munoelectrophoretic evidence. The two scientific identification
techniques produce specific propositions that the proteins in the
unknown blood sample are exactly the same as the proteins in the
known blood sample. These propositions, however, are meaning-
less to the trier of fact until the general proposition of science, that
protein differences arise between different animal species, is ap-
plied to the specific propositions. It is only then that the trier of
fact can relate the specific propositions obtained from the two sci-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. Id. at 6.
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entific identification techniques to the issues in the case. The
trier can then reason that if protein differences arise between dif-
ferent animal species and if the two identification techniques
showed no protein differences between the unknown blood sample
and the known blood sample, they must be from the same animal
species. This reasoning allows the test data to be brought to bear
on the issues of the case.
In these instances, where the line of proof directed at establish-
ing a material fact involves both a specific proposition scientifi-
cally obtained and a general proposition of science which shows
the significance of the specific proposition to the case at hand, the
court must first test the admissibility of the general proposition
and then, if it finds the general proposition admissible, test the ad-
missibility of the specific proposition. The following discussion will
explain the general tests and procedures for determining the ad-
missibility, first, of general propositions of science and, second, of
specific propositions obtained by scientific techniques.
A. General Propositions of Science
"If a general principle of science will be necessary to show the
relevancy of a given line of proof, the most expeditious manner in
which that principle may be established is through the use of judi-
cial notice." 35 It is now well known that the general propositions
of science upon which fingerprinting, blood tests to determine in-
toxication and nonpaternity, and radar checks of automobile speed
are based have been given judicial notice.36 What then must be
shown concerning a general proposition of science in order to per-
suade a court to take judicial notice of its validity? When the courts
have no precedent to guide them on the issue, they have generally
turned to one of two suggested standards for assistance. One
standard asserts that judicial notice may be taken of generally
known facts but should not be taken of facts which are known, if at
all, only by a specially informed class of persons.37 The alterna-
tive standard, as suggested by Professor McCormick, asserts that
judicial notice may be taken of all scientific facts for which ready
and indisputable verification exists. 38 The new Nebraska Evi-
dence Rules39 appear to have adopted a combination of the two
standards:
35. Id.
36. See C. McCoRmcu, EVIDENCE § 330 (2d ed. 1972).
37. See Lewis v. Firestone, 130 A.2d 317 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957); Lickfelt v.
Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321,229 N.W. 138 (1930); Alexander v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
38. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 36, § 330.
39. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 1103 (Reissue 1975).
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A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (b) capable of accurate and ready determination by re-
sort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
4 0
It would appear that under this combined standard, the Commis-
sion would be able to persuade a Nebraska court to take judicial
notice of the general proposition of science that protein differences
exist between different animal species. Although it is questiona-
ble whether the Commission could ever show that the general pro-
position is "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court," it seems clear that it is "capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." The Commission need only exhibit to
the court some of the many nationally recognized publications cit-
ing the general proposition as the "central dogma of molecular bi-
ology."14 1
Even if a court refuses to take judicial notice of the validity of a
general scientific proposition, that validity may still be shown by
expert testimony. Although an occasional case may be found sug-
gesting that unless judicial notice is taken of the general scientific
proposition the evidence is inadmissible, the overwhelming weight
of authority is clearly to the contrary.42 There are three basic hur-
dles that must be cleared in establishing the validity of a general
scientific proposition by expert testimony.43 -The first is that the
expert witness must be qualified by sufficient foundation evi-
dence.44 This has nothing to do with the validity of the proposition
itself; it merely establishes that the witness is in fact an expert.
The second hurdle is that the expert witness be shown to be sup-
plying information solely from the field of his or her special knowl-
edge and not from areas beyond those of his or her demonstrated
competence. 45 The third and final hurdle is that the general pro-
position upon which the expert witness proposes to testify must
have achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.46
This final requirement of general acceptance was originally set
forth in the case of Frye v. United States47 and has come to be
commonly known as the Frye standard.48
40. Id. § 27-201(2).
41. See C. MAwELL, supra note 9, at 394.
42. See Strong, supra note 25, at 9.
43. Id. at 9-11.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id at 10-11.
47. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
48. Exactly what the Frye standard requires is unclear- 'The resulting standard,
something greater than acceptance by the expert himself but less than ac-
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The critical factor in whether a general scientific proposition
has achieved "general acceptance" seems to be whether some sci-
entific profession has used it as a working tool in its particular
field of science. Under this type of analysis, it would appear that
the general scientific proposition upon which the Commission re-
lies has achieved general acceptance within the scientific commu-
nity. The profession of forensic medicine has relied upon the
general proposition since the turn of the century when it began
using it in its precipitin identification tests of blood samples. Ad-
ditionally, the medical and dental professions have relied upon the
general proposition in many research oriented projects. 49 It would
appear, then, that should a Nebraska court refuse to give judicial
notice to the general scientific proposition relied upon by the Com-
mission in its scientific identification techniques, the validity of
the proposition could still be shown by expert testimony. The
Commission would merely have to call as a witness its senior biol-
ogist or chemist, qualify him or her as an expert in the fields of
biology or chemistry, and have him or her testify to the fact that
the general proposition is the central dogma of molecular biology
which has been used in the field of forensic medicine for many
years.
B. Specific Propositions Obtained By Scientific Techniques
For the most part, the methods by which the validity of a scien-
tific test or device is established are the same as those used to es-
tablish the validity of a general scientific proposition. The test or
device's validity may be established by either judicial notice or ex-
pert testimony. "Since scientific methods for the acquisition of
specific data are themselves applications of other general scientific
principles, no distinction appears warranted between the standard
for judicial notice of a general scientific principle and that for no-
tice of a specific testing device or method. '50 However, it is not
clear whether the standards for establishing the validity of a scien-
tific testing device or method by expert testimony are the same as
those used to establish the validity of a general scientific proposi-
tion by expert testimony. The witness must, of course, still be
qualified as an expert by the appropriate foundation evidence.
The expert must also limit testimony to information solely within
the bounds of his or her expertise. However, the courts have not
ceptance by all experts in the field, is obviously somewhat lacking in defini-
tiveness." Strong, supra note 25, at 11.
49. The central dogma of molecular biology is used by these professions when
making diagnoses of diseases which cause damage to the proteins in the
blood.
50. Strong, supra note 25, at 15.
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been in full agreement as to whether the expert may only testify
on behalf of scientific testing devices or techniques which have
achieved "general acceptance in the scientific community." Some
courts have applied the Frye standard in this context.51 It is their
view that the "general acceptance" requirement applies just as
forcefully to the establishment of the validity of scientific testing
devices and techniques as it does to the establishment of the valid-
ity of a general scientific proposition.
The Nebraska Supreme Court appears to have applied the Frye
standard in the case of Boeche v. State.52 The issue in the case
was whether the results of a polygraph test, to which the defend-
ant had voluntarily submitted, were admissible evidence5 3 The
court, after reviewing many reported cases, held that the scientific
testing results were inadmissible:
It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific princi-
ple involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the
experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet
received general scientific acceptance. The experimenting psychologists
themselves admit that a wholly accurate test is yet to be perfected.
4
Consequently, it would appear that in order to establish the valid-
ity of a scientific testing device or technique in a Nebraska court, it
must be established that the device or technique has achieved gen-
eral acceptance within the scientific community.
If the Commission must, by way of expert testimony, show gen-
eral acceptance within the scientific community of the immunodif-
fusion and immunoelectrophoretic identification techniques
before their results will be admissible evidence in Nebraska, it
might attempt to do so by either of two methods. Under the first
method, the initial step would be to explain how the two new tech-
niques are in essence merely refined versions of the precipitin test
which has been in existence since 1901.55 The next step would be
to show the wide recognition that the precipitin test has now
achieved. The California courts have convicted a person for viola-
tion of game laws solely on the basis of the precipitin test's re-
sults.56 Nationally-recognized trial preparation books suggest the
use of the precipitin test as evidence.57 Leading treatises on scien-
tific evidence have hailed the precipitin test as "[t] he confirmatory
test to identify a substance as being blood, and further classifying
51. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); State v. Bohner,
210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
52. 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
53. Id. at 376, 37 N.W.2d at 597.
54. Id. at 377, 37 N.W.2d at 597.
55. See J. RicHARDsoN, supra note 2, at 11.
56. See Wolfe, supra note 13, at 56.
57. See 2 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTs Blood Tests, Proof 1 (1959).
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it as being from animal or human origin."58 Furthermore, a na-
tional survey made by the Commission in 1973 revealed that fish
and game agencies in at least thirteen states were using the pre-
cipitin test for the identification of the species' origin of blood and
tissue samples5 9 The final step would be to impress upon the
court that since immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoresis are
improved refinements of the precipitin test, they should be ac-
corded the same judicial recognition as the precipitin test.
The second method of using expert testimony to establish gen-
eral acceptance within the scientific community of the immunodif-
fusion and immunoelectrophoretic identification techniques would
be the introduction of national survey findings regarding their us-
age.60 The Commission's 1973 national survey revealed that the
58. See A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 252.
59. The 1973 survey found that Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wis-
consin were using the precipitin test at that time. D. OATES, C. BROWN & D.
WEIGEL, supra note 6, at A-1 to -13.
60. The surveys themselves are hearsay evidence. However, it has long been
recognized in this country that the special skill of an expert witness enables
him or her safely and properly to utilize hearsay material to determine the
facts upon which an opinion rests. FED. R. EviD. 703, Adv. Comm. Note. This
expert validation of hearsay evidence offered to establish factual premises
does not, however, make the hearsay itself admissible. There are many situ-
ations in which expert opinion must rest on propositions of fact practically
unprovable by conventional means, but as to which there is hearsay material
so plainly reliable that the courts can be confident of its accuracy. It is in
these situations that experts are allowed to testify to their relevant opinions
simply on the basis of their own personal acquaintance with the reliable
hearsay evidence. A perfect example of this occurs when an expert is al-
lowed to testify to the value of a particular piece of realty when the only ba-
ses for the opinion are past discussions with realtors and published lists of
sale or market prices. See Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for
Expert Opinion, 5 VAND. L. REV. 432 (1952).
Consequently, it would appear that a qualified expert witness for the
Commission could use the surveys as a basis for stating an opinion that the
immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoresis techniques are generally ac-
cepted within the scientific community. The expert need not disclose the ba-
sis of the opinion on direct examination and it would probably be wise for the
proponent of the expert not to ask questions on it. An unperceptive cross
examiner will fail to notice that the general acceptance of the two scientific
identification techniques is being established on the basis of hearsay evi-
dence. After the results of the two identification techniques are admitted,
the unperceptive cross examiner is stuck with the evidence and the only re-
course is to attempt to discredit its value in the eyes of the trier of fact. On
the other hand, if the cross examiner is perceptive, he or she will notice what
the proponent of the witness is doing and will immediately request the basis
of the expert's opinion. At this time, the expert must disclose reliance on the
results of national surveys. The cross examiner will then undoubtedly object
to the admission of results from the two identification techniques.
The court must then determine whether the surveys are so plainly reliable
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fish and game agencies of seven states, other than Nebraska, were
using the immunodiffusion identification technique. 61 Addition-
ally, the survey showed that the fish and game agencies of three
states, other than Nebraska, were using some type of electropho-
retic identification technique. 62 Furthermore, a recent Canadian
survey revealed that the game law enforcement agencies of two
Canadian provinces were using electrophoretic identification tech-
niques. 63
In January, 1978, the Commission initiated a second survey in
an effort to determine what types of blood and tissue identification
techniques were becoming most popular. The results from the
thirty-seven states which had responded as of April 13, 1978, re-
vealed that fourteen states 64 were still using the precipitin test;
nine states 65 were using immunodiffusion techniques; and nine
states66 had implemented some form of electrophoretic identifica-
tion technique.67 Additionally, two states indicated that they were
presently experimenting with electrophoretic techniques and
as to carry confident conviction. If the court decides that they are suffi-
ciently reliable, the expert's opinion will not be barred, and may then be used
to establish general acceptance within the scientific community of the immu-
nodiffusion and immunoelectrophoresis techniques. Even if the court
should decide that the surveys were not sufficiently reliable and thereby bar
the expert's opinion, the proponent of the expert might still be able to get the
surveys admitted as substantive evidence pursuant to an exception to the
hearsay rule. This might be accomplished under either NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-
803(2) (Reissue 1975) (state of mind exception) or NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
803(22) (Reissue 1975) (necessity-trustworthiness exception). Accord,
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
61. The states included Arizona, Colorado, Maine, Montana, Oregon, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. D. OATEs, C. BROWN & D. WEIGEL, supra note 6, at A-1 to -13.
62. Id. This group consisted of California, Idaho, and Oregon.
63. The survey, conducted by Mr. Stan Webb for the Alberta Fish and Wildlife
Division, Department of Lands and Forests, revealed that the provinces of
Alberta and New Brunswick were using electrophoretic identification tech-
niques.
64. The states included Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas.
65. This group was composed of Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.
66. These states were Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Wyoming.
67. It must be pointed out that these states are probably not the only states using
one or more of the three identification techniques. Several state fish and
game agencies who responded to the survey stated that they did not have
their own forensic laboratory facilities. These respondents all stated that
any blood or tissue samples which they needed to have identified were sent
to either a state or federal crime lab to be tested. The respondents were
unable to state on their survey returns exactly what identification techniques
were used by the crime labs. Consequently, it is quite possible that many
state fish and game agencies are indirectly, through state or federal crime
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would be implementing them soon.68 Nearly all the survey re-
spondents who were using immunodiffusion and electrophoretic
identification techniques stated that evidence derived from their
techniques had been accepted as admissible evidence in court
cases dealing with possible game law violations. However, none
of the respondents were aware of any reported opinions specifi-
cally addressing the admissibility issue.69 One can speculate that,
as of this time, only lower-level trial courts, whose decisions are
not reported, have been confronted with the issue and have de-
cided in favor of admitting the evidence. Nonetheless, this absence
of reported decisions is not a critical factor in determining general
acceptance within the scientific community of the immunodiffu-
sion and immunoelectrophoretic techniques. As the Commis-
sion's 1973 and 1978 surveys demonstrate, more and more states
are implementing the two techniques in their game law enforce-
ment programs every year. Furthermore, more state trial courts
are allowing the results to be admitted into evidence each year.
These facts, in themselves, are a substantial aid in establishing the
general acceptance of the two scientific identification techniques..
It is important to note, however, that many courts have not im-
posed the Frye standard of general acceptance in cases in which
the issue was the validity of a particular scientific testing device or
technique.70 The following criticism has generally been made of
the use of the standard:
The requirement of "general acceptance" before admitting scientific
evidence can itself be a thorny problem. If it must be established that the
particular test has received wide application to show acceptance, a diffi-
cult burden may exist if the scientific principle is logically sound, but, be-
cause it is unique, time has not allowed the required application. In
addition, if there is little opportunity for the application of scientific tests
upon which the evidence may be based, valuable evidence may be unnec-
essarily rejected. Further, little room may be left to receive evidence
where differing schools of thought may disagree as to its reliability.
71
Other critics of the standard have argued:
[R] ules of evidence must be liberalized to take full advantage of scientific
proof, i.e., it is irrational to set up "general scientific acceptance" as the
criterion for admissibility when no such standard of certainty exists any-
labs, using the immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic identification
techniques although they are unaware of it.
68. These two states were Alaska and Utah.
69. Information derived from Commission survey (January 1978).
70. See, e.g., State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893(1954); People v. Gamier, 20
Ill. App. 2d 492, 156 N.E.2d 613 (1959); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99
N.E.2d 567 (1951); City of Abilene v. Hall, 202 Kan. 636, 451 P.2d 188 (1969);
Toms v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 60, 239 P.2d 812 (1952); Commonwealth v. Mum-
mert, 183 Pa. Super. 638, 133 A.2d 301 (1957); McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crnn.
416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1951).
71. Boyce, supra note 1, at 314.
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where else in the law of evidence. Certainly, this standard is not required
or expected of witnesses. Such a rigid standard for admissibility ignores
that probative value is a relative concept for the triers of fact to weigh and
measure.
7 2
Seemingly in response to these criticisms, the courts refusing
to impose the Frye standard have adopted a more liberal standard
of acceptance.7 3 These courts have generally held that evidence
derived from scientific testing devices and techniques is admissi-
ble as long as a qualified expert witness testifies that, in his or her
opinion, the particular test method employed is reliable and accu-
rate, and that it is generally accepted as such by other experts in
the field, rather than the entire scientific community.7 4 The fact
that there may be some disagreement in the scientific community
as to the reliability of a particular test method is considered a mat-
ter affecting the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
A perfect example of a court applying this more liberal accept-
ance standard to a scientific test in an effort to determine its ad-
missibility is People v. Williams.75 The issue faced by the court
was whether the results of a Nalline test to ascertain whether a
person was under the influence of a narcotic were admissible sci-
entific evidence. The court held that the test results were admissi-
ble as long as it was shown that the test had gained acceptance in
the field of learning in which it was in use.7 6 In other words, all
that needed to be shown was that a specialty within a general field
of science had recognized the reliability of the scientific test. Evi-
dence that the medical profession, as a whole, endorsed the tech-
nique was not necessary. Indeed, the average physician would
probably have little or no knowledge about the Naline test, or any
other test of a similar nature.
The Nalline test decision recognized the fact that specialization
in today's scientific community makes it impossible for many tests
72. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 15 n.17. It is the belief of many of these crit-
ics that
general scientific acceptance is a proper condition for the court to
take judicial notice of a scientific fact, without laying the usual foun-
dation, but not a sound criterion for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Any relevant conclusions, which are supported by a qualified
expert witness, in a field finding substantial scientific acceptance
should be admitted in evidence, for its probative value to be weighed
by competent fact-finders in the light of all the circumstances. The
courts should not confuse novelty with want of acceptance in refus-
ing to admit the results of scientific techniques which offer much in
aiding to ascertain the truth.
Id. at 24.
73. See note 70 supra.
74. See Boyce, supra note 1, at 314.
75. 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
76. Id. at 860, 331 P.2d at 253.
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to become widely known and generally accepted within a profes-
sion. The decision, however, gave little guidance to courts faced
with the admissibility of tests of a more experimental nature
which have been devised to meet the demands of a particular sci-
entific problem but are relatively unknown by experts in the field.
In 1968, the decision in Coppolino v. State7 7 appeared to supply
that guidance.
The Coppolino case was replete with scientific evidence for both the
defense and the prosecution. Most significant, however, was evidence of
scientific tests which had been specifically devised by a pathologist to re-
veal the presence of a certain chemical in body tissue. The test was previ-
ously unknown among pathologists, and expert witnesses for the opposing
side testified to its lack of proven reliability. The court nevertheless up-
held the admissibility of the test results on the theory that novel test re-
sults, specifically devised to explore a given problem, are not necessarily
inadmissible simply because the profession at large is not yet familiar
with them, so long as the expert witness lays a proper foundation for his
opinion and explains what accepted principles of analysis he used.7 8
The result in Coppolino was justified on the basis of the trial
judge's wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evi-
dence.7 9
The rejection by some courts of the Frye standard in determin-
ing the validity of scientific testing devices and techniques encour-
ages speculation about the chances of persuading a Nebraska
court to apply a more liberal acceptance standard to the immu-
nodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic identification techniques.
The answer might be found by making a closer analysis of the
Boeche case. The majority stated the following reasons for requir-
ing general acceptance of the polygraph test in the scientific com-
munity before its results are admissible in evidence:
Cogent reasons in support of this attitude readily suggest themselves.
In the first place, the vital function of cross-examination would be im-
paired. The operator, appearing as a witness to report and interpret the
results of the test, might be questioned as to his qualifications, experi-
ence, his methods, and on similar matters, and that is about alL But the
machine itself-conceding the comparatively high percentage record as to
accuracy and reliability claimed for it-escapes all cross-examination.
There is no persuasive analogy here with such tests as fingerprinting
which have a strictly physical basis, clearly demonstrable. It is not con-
tended that the lie detector measures or weighs the important psychologi-
cal factors.
80
Unlike the polygraph test, the immunodiffusion and immu-
noelectrophoretic techniques can be persuasively analogized to
77. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
78. A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 5.
79. See Strong, supra note 25, at 16.
80. 151 Neb. at 377, 37 N.W.2d at 597.
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fingerprinting tests. That is to say, the tests can be replicated.
This is because they, too, have a strictly physical basis which is
clearly demonstrable. The two scientific identification techniques
are based solely on the separation and comparison of blood pro-
teins. Their results yield what has commonly been referred to as a
"fingerprint" of the blood. For this reason, it can be hypothesized
that the court might be willing to apply a more liberal acceptance
standard to the immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic tech-
niques when determining the admissibility of their results, even
though it applies the Frye standard to polygraph tests. This hy-
pothesis is fortified by Justice Chappell's concurring opinion in
Boeche.81 Justice Chappell noted that a New York court had ad-
mitted the results of a pathometer test 82 after a competent founda-
tion for the expert testimony regarding the results had been laid.83
Justice Chappell quoted language from that opinion noting that
testimony as to fingerprints, X-rays, handwriting, bullet markings,
and psychiatric examinations was admissible evidence despite the
fact that testifying experts frequently differed in their conclu-
sions.8 In those cases in which experts differed it was merely left
to the jury to determine which expert, if any, it was going to be-
lieve. The New York court had reasoned that if such conflicting
testimony was admissible, then it logically followed that testimony
as to the pathometer test and its results should be admissible
when a proper foundation had been laid. It was up to the jury to
decide how much weight to give the scientific evidence. With this,
Justice Chappell agreed and he subsequently stated: "Modern
court procedure must embrace recognized modern conditions of
mechanics, psychology, sociology, medicine, or other sciences, phi-
losophy and history. The failure to do so will only serve to ques-
tion the ability of the courts to efficiently administer justice.' '85
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that Nebraska trial courts,
like the Coppolino court, have wide latitude in the admission of
experimental tests. 86 Unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, a
81. Id. at 378, 37 N.W.2d at 597 (Chappell, J., concurring).
82. A pathometer is a lie detector that measures electrical impulses of the body;
a polygraph is a lie detector which measures pulse, blood pressure, and respi-
ration.
83. 151 Neb. at 381, 37 N.W.2d at 599 (citing People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3
N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938)).
84. 151 Neb. at 382, 37 N.W.2d at 599 (quoting 167 Misc. at 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 350).
85. 151 Neb. at 383,37 N.W.2d at 600. Justice Chappell, however, believed that the
more liberal acceptance standard could not be used in the Boeche case be-
cause the proper foundation had not been laid for the testimony on the poly-
graph and its results. Consequently, he concurred with the majority in
excluding the test results.
86. See Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 557, 209 N.W.2d 643,
650 (1973).
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judgment will not be reversed on account of the admission of such
testimony.87 In these cases, the foundational prerequisite to the
admission of the test results is that the proponent demonstrate the
competence of the person making the test, that the device or tech-
nique used was of a kind and in a condition suitable for the test,
and that the test was fairly and honestly made.88 All the above
considerations lead to the belief that the Nebraska courts today
would be willing to apply a more liberal standard than the Frye
standard to the immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic
identification techniques when determining the admissibility of
their results. The determination of the weight to be given the sci-
entific evidence would, of course, be left to the jury.
It is also of some interest to note that recently an argument has
surfaced for the rejection of the Frye standard, based on the new
Federal Rules of Evidence.89 It is urged that the new rules em-
body a new theory of admissibility for scientific evidence.9 0 Pro-
ponents of this view argue that since the new rules of evidence do
not specifically mention "general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity," they are not a codification of the Frye standard. Rather,
the new theory for admissibility is based upon the language of
Rules 401 and 402.91 Rule 402, as adopted by the Nebraska Legisla-
ture,92 establishes the general rule of admissibility for all evidence:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the State of Nebraska, by Act of Con-
gress or of the Legislature of the State of Nebraska, by these rules, or by
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska which are not in
conflict with laws governing such matters. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.93
Consequently, if scientific evidence is to be admissible, it must
first be relevant. Relevant evidence is defined in Rule 401: "Rele-
vant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable than it would be without the evidence."
In other words, if the evidence has any probative value it meets the
test for relevancy.95 The critical question, then, becomes whether
the scientific evidence in question has any probative value. Rule
87. Id.
88. Id. at 557, 209 N.W.2d at 651.
89. Nebraska has, with some changes, adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 1103 (Reissue 1975).
90. See Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico
and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M. L. REV. 187 (1976).
91. Id. at 200.
92. NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-402 (Reissue 1975).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 27-401.
95. Romero, supra note 90, at 201.
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401 does not expressly state how to determine probative value.
However, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence indicated that the answer to this question "depends upon
principles evolved by experience or science, applied logically to
the situation at hand."9 6 Logically, then, the scientific principles
upon which a scientific technique is based should be examined. If
these underlying principles are scientifically valid in the sense
that the test results reliably indicate whatever the test was
designed to prove, the technique has a tendency to prove credibil-
ity and is, therefore, relevant.9 7
Although general acceptance of the scientific device or tech-
nique among the scientific community is not required by Rules 401
or 402, it is still an important consideration under the new rules of
evidence.98 The lack of general scientific acceptance in the scien-
tific community may still operate to exclude the scientific evi-
dence. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 99 Consequently, if
the judge determines that possible harm which may be caused if
the scientific evidence is admitted substantially outweighs the pro-
bative value of such evidence, it may be excluded.
Under this new theory of admissibility of scientific evidence,
the immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic identification
techniques' results would be admissible evidence if it were shown
that they were relevant and that their probative value substan-
tially outweighed any possible harm that might be caused by their
admission. The relevancy of the two techniques could be estab-
lished by having an expert witness testify to the validity of the gen-
eral scientific proposition upon which the two techniques are
based, i.e., that protein differences exist between different animal
species. The expert could also testify to the validity of the two
techniques' blood protein separation and identification processes.
It would then be left to the discretion of the judge whether the pro-
bative value of the evidence outweighs any possible harm that
might be caused by its admission.
In summary, there are three standards of acceptance which are
more liberal than the Frye standard: (1) general acceptance by
some experts within a particular field of science rather than the
96. FED. R. Evm. 401, Adv. Comm. Note.
97. Romero, supra note 90, at 201.
98. Id. at 207.
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (Reissue 1975).
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entire scientific community;100 (2) admission of unique, relatively
unknown, experimental evidence pursuant to the trial court's wide
power of discretion; 0 1 and (3) relevancy under the newly adopted
rules of evidence. 0 2 There is reason to believe that the Nebraska
courts might be persuaded to apply one of the three more liberal
standards to the Commission's two scientific identification tech-
niques when attempting to determine the admissibility of their re-
sults into evidence. Should the Nebraska courts decide to apply
any one of the three standards in place of the Frye standard, it is
clear the Commission could make an extremely convincing argu-
ment that the identification techniques' results are admissible sci-
entific evidence.
C. Laying A Proper Foundation
After establishing the admissibility of a particular scientific de-
vice or technique's results in general, it remains necessary to es-
tablish that the device or technique was correctly and properly
used or applied in the particular case in question. "Though this
point may appear self-evident, the failure to distinguish between a
valid method and a valid use of that method on a particular occa-
sion would appear to have produced more errors in the admission
of scientific evidence than any other single cause."103 In order to
show the correct and proper use of a scientific device or technique,
foundation testimony is required to explain the steps followed on
the particular occasion in question. There are no explicit rules de-
lineating exactly what must be shown in order to lay a sufficient
foundation concerning the manner of use of a scientific device or
technique on a particular occasion. However, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has established three broad general foundational
requirements for such instances.104 First, the competence of the
person who made the test must be shown.105 Second, the scien-
tific device or technique used must be shown to be of a kind and in
a condition suitable for the test.106 Finally, the test must be shown
to have been honestly and fairly made.107 In each case, it is left to
the discretion of the trial court to determine whether each of the
above three elements has been satisfied.
100. See note 70 & accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 77-78 & accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 90-91 & accompanying text supra.
103. Strong, supra note 25, at 18.
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A corollary question is who must be called as an expert witness
to lay the foundation. When only a specific application of the test
is in question, it has generally been held that the necessary foun-
dation testimony may be given by a witness who is qualified to
mechanically operate the test even though that person may or may
not have sufficient expertise to explain its underlying theory or in-
terperet its results. 10 8 Conversely, the courts have generally re-
fused to allow a witness who has expertise in the principles and
theory of the testing process to testify in regard to the three foun-
dational requirements if he or she did not personally conduct the
test in question. 'The credentials of such a witness, no matter
how impressive, do not substitute for the credentials of the opera-
tor."' 0 9 The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, has shown a will-
ingness to admit the results of a scientific test without requiring
the testimony of the test operator, provided the witness supervised
the test procedure and it is established that the operator of the test
was qualified to conduct it. In the case of Houghton v.
Houghton,1" 0 the court held that a qualified pathologist who made
blood grouping tests with the assistance of experienced techni-
cians could testify to the test results from the particular occasion
in question,"' without calling the technicians to give foundation
testimony.112
Consequently, after the admissibility of the immunodiffusion
and immunoelectrophoretic techniques is established, it will be-
come incumbent upon the Commission to demonstrate that the
identification techniques were correctly and properly performed in
each particular case in question. An expert witness will have to
be called to explain the steps followed in performing the particular
test involved. In Nebraska, this witness may be either the opera-
tor of the testing device or the person who supervised a properly
qualified operator.
Finally, in order for the Commission to show that a particular
test has been fairly and honestly made, it will have to produce tes-
timony as to the identity and condition of the blood and tissue
samples actually tested. Obviously, this must be done in order to
assure the court that the samples seized from the suspected game
law violator were the ones tested and that they were in such a con-
dition that they could be accurately tested. Furthermore, due to
the process used in each of the two scientific identification tech-
108. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. Hall, 202 Kan. 636, 451 P.2d 188 (1969).
109. Strong, supra note 25, at 20-21.
110. 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965).
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12,115 (Reissue 1975) was cited as statutory support for
the court's holding.
112. 179 Neb. at 280-81, 137 N.W.2d at 866.
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niques, the Commission will also have to establish the identity and
condition of its known blood, tissue, and antiserum laboratory
samples.
At trial, the first question will be whether the blood or tissue
sample analyzed or examined by the Commission's expert in its
laboratory, or produced in court as a basis for demonstrations
before the jury, can be properly identified as the same sample
seized from the defendant. 113 The burden of proof is on the Com-
mission, as the party relying on the scientific evidence, to show the
sample was seized from the defendant, and properly stored, and, if
necessary, transported and delivered to the expert who made the
analysis or examination.114 Identity of a sample seized from the
defendant may be established by direct testimony of a witness that
to his or her personal knowledge the sample tested was the sample
seized from the defendant. 1 5 However, if the sample in question
has passed through several hands before being analyzed, the testi-
mony of a single witness will not suffice. In such circumstances, it
is necessary to establish a complete chain of custody by having
everyone who ever had custody of the sample testify from whom
the evidence was received and to whom it was delivered. 1 6 If one
link of this chain of custody is not accounted for, then the sample
cannot be made the.basis of any expert testimony in the case."17
Additionally, in Nebraska, "the probability of any tampering-with
the objects of such test must be negatived before evidence of this
nature is admitted.""18
The Commission would not appear to have any problem estab-
lishing the identity of the samples tested as those seized from the
defendant. In each case that it deems sufficiently important to
use one of its two scientific identification techniques, the Commis-
sion requires that the officer who seized the sample personally de-
liver it to the Commission's laboratory in Lincoln.119 Once
received at the laboratory, the sample is labeled and placed in a
locked refrigerated evidence chamber to which only the senior
chemist has a key.120 When the sample is to be tested, the senior
chemist removes it from the evidence chamber, personally super-
113. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1219 (1952).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1220.
117. See, e.g., Roskey v. Hulewicz, 185 Neb. 608, 177 N.W.2d 744 (1970). The court
refused to admit evidence of the results of a urine test when the prosecution
could not clearly establish who had taken the urine sample from the defend-
ant.
118. Hershiser v. Chicago B. & Q. R.P., 102 Neb. 820, 825, 170 N.W. 177, 179 (1918).
119. Interview with David W. Oates, Comm'n Senior Chemist (March 10, 1978).
120. Id.
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vises the testing procedures, and when the test is over, returns any
of the remaining sample to the evidence chamber for storage.121
This procedure negates the possibility of any tampering with the
sample. Also, by using this procedure, the Commission limits to
two the number of custody witnesses it must produce at trial: the
field officer who seized the sample and delivered it to the labora-
tory, and the senior chemist who received the sample and super-
vised its storage and testing.
The Commission may be somewhat overcautious in requiring
its field officers to personally deliver all samples to the testing lab-
oratory. Nebraska case law suggests that the Commission could
have its field officers mail all samples into the laboratory and still
only have to call two witnesses to establish the chain of custody of
the sample at trial.122 The most significant Nebraska Supreme
Court decision in regard to this issue is Schacht v. State.123 In
that case, a doctor had taken samples of the defendant's blood for
the purpose of having a chemical analysis made to determine if the
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He
placed the samples in two vials and marked them with the defend-
ant's name and the time of taking. Since it was a Sunday, the doc-
tor then took the samples home with him and placed them in a
refrigerator. The next morning, he wrapped them in an invoice
requesting a blood examination and mailed them to the state de-
partment of health. The samples were received at the laboratory
in due course and delivered to the proper persons in the depart-
ment. The defendant contended at trial that since there was no
testimony by the person who picked up the samples at the post
office, the foundation was insufficient to admit the results of the
test into evidence.124 The court disagreed:
We think there is a presumption that articles transported by regular
United States mail and delivered in the ordinary course of the mails are
delivered in substantially the same condition in which they are sent. This
presumption is a rebuttable one, but where there is no evidence tending to
overcome the presumption it is sufficient to establish the identity of the
article mailed and that it is in substantially the same condition as at the
time of mailing. The rule for which the defendant contends would place a
great burden upon addressee, such as the one here involved, to keep me-
ticulous records of mail deliveries to protect against the mere possibility
that articles so delivered might possibly become pertinent in a court pro-
ceeding. We think the objection as to foundation on this ground was
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., State v. Bullard, 186 Neb. 709, 185 N.W.2d 864 (1971); State v. Tatreau,
176 Neb. 381, 126 N.W.2d 157 (1964); Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 50 N.W.2d 78
(1951).
123. 154 Neb. 858, 50 N.W.2d 78 (1951).
124. Id. at 860, 50 N.W.2d at 79.
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properly overruled. 1 2
5
After establishing the identity of the samples tested, it will be
incumbent upon the Commission to show they were in such a con-
dition that they could be accurately tested by the immunodiffusion
and immunoelectrophoretic techniques. The blood samples
tested by the Commission are recovered in the form of (1) fresh
blood, (2) clotted blood, (3) smears or (4) flakes. 126 Additionally,
the blood samples are recovered on a variety of items, the most
common ones being knives and pieces of clothing. Before the
samples have been seized from the suspect, they undoubtedly
have been subjected to a variety of unknown factors. "Heat, hu-
midity, and sunlight do have a deleterious effect on blood. Also,
blood decomposes in a short time without proper preservatives.' 2 7
Furthermore, there is always the possibility that the blood sample
has come into contact with dirt or chemicals before it was seized.
These general factors, along with many other factors that can be
hypothesized in each case, create questions as to the condition of
the blood sample tested. It becomes obvious the Commission may
never be able to establish that the sample tested was one hundred
percent pure. The problem then is to determine the effect this has
upon the admissibility of the results of the Commission's two sci-
entific identification techniques.
"Admittedly, the changes which take place in blood drying are
largely unknown.' 1 28 Undoubtedly, some features of fresh blood
are lost when the blood undergoes drying, denaturation, and envi-
ronmental contamination, but the exact effects of the foregoing on
the blood's constituency are yet to be discovered. "It is known at
least that some labile constituents, such as various enzymes, sev-
eral antibodies, the serum proteins in general, and numerous
others, do not alter rapidly enough to invalidate their successful
study in the forensic laboratory."' 29 Consequently, P. L. Kirk and
B. W. Grunbaum, two of this country's leading experts on the fo-
rensic uses of blood, believe the lack of complete and precise infor-
mation on the changes which occur in blood should not deter the
use of immunological identification techniques. 130 They base this
conclusion on the fact that many blood proteins are known to re-
sist denaturation for relatively long periods when the blood is
dried. 31 This would seem to suggest that an argument by a de-
fendant to the effect that the two scientific identification tech-
125. Id. at 861, 50 N.W.2d at 80.
126. Interview with David W. Oates, Comm'n Senior Chemist (March 10, 1978).
127. A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 259.
128. Kirk & Grunbaum, supra note 7, at 290.
129. Id. at 290-91.
130. Id. at 296-97.
131. Id
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niques results should not be admitted because the blood sample
tested was not one hundred percent pure fresh blood would be un-
founded. Rather, any questions which the particular condition of
the blood sample tested might create as to the accuracy of the
identification results would go only to the weight and credibility to
be given them and not their admissibility.
Authority for the position that the condition of a tested blood
sample affects only credibility and not the admissibility of the test
results may be found in State v. Fox.132 The defendant had been
taken into custody upon suspicion of driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol. A blood sample was taken by the doctor of his
choice. The test for alcohol was conducted by a licensed techni-
cian of the state department of health according to methods ap-
proved by the department. The test results showed the defendant
to be under the influence of alcohol. At trial, the defendant was
convicted upon the basis of this evidence. On appeal, he argued
that his blood sample had been contaminated by an anticoagulant
in the vial in which it was placed and by the use of an antiseptic to
cleanse his arm before the sample was withdrawn. He further ar-
gued that the state had failed to carry its burden of proving that
the sample was not contaminated and demanded that the evidence
be stricken.133 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the evi-
dence was admissible:
It is obvious from the record that all the statutory foundational require-
ments for the admission of the result of the blood analysis have been met,
and such evidence was competent and properly admitted. There is noth-
ing in the statutes which, either expressly or inferentially, prohibits the
use of an anticoagulant for the purpose of preserving the blood during the
interim from withdrawal until the test. Any evidence to the effect that the
alcoholic content of the defendant's blood might have been affected by the
presence of an improper amount of anticoagulant in the test tube, or by
the use of an antiseptic to cleanse the arm before injection with the sy-
ringe and needle, would have no effect upon the admissibility of the test,
but, rather, such evidence would go only to the weight and credibility of
the test.
It was not the legislative intent that all possibility of inaccuracy or im-
perfection in the test should be excluded before being received in evi-
dence. It is apparent that the intention of the Legislature was that such
tests are admissible, and prima facie proof, whenever it be established
that the statutory requirements are satisfied, which is true in the instant
case, and the presence or absence of other facts which might reflect upon
the verity of the test results affect only the matter of rebuttal of the statu-
tory presumption, not the admissibility of the test results, as such.
1 3 4
The same type of rationale would appear to apply to the admis-
sibility of the results of the Commission's two new scientific iden-
132. 177 Neb. 238, 128 N.W.2d 576 (1964).
133. Id. at 249, 128 N.W.2d at 582.
134. Id.
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tification techniques when the condition of the sample tested is in
question; It would be highly unreasonable to require the Commis-
sion to rebut every conceivable factor that may have affected the
condition of the sample tested before the identification results
could be received in evidence. The more logical position to take
would be to allow the results to be admitted into evidence and let
the finder of fact determine what credence to give them in light of
questions raised by the defendant as to the condition of the sample
tested. This position appears even more justified in light of the
fact that the Commission, as a practical matter, would not continue
to prosecute a case in which its results indicate damaging contami-
nation of the sample tested. If it did, the defense attorney would
merely have to ask to have the test slides shown to the jury and the
visibly poor quality of the precipitin formations produced by the
badly contaminated sample would undoubtedly destroy any belief
the jury might have in the accuracy of the test results.
Due to the particular process used in the Commission's two
new scientific identification techniques, it will also have to estab-
lish the identity and condition of its known blood, tissue, and anti-
serum laboratory samples before its identification results will be
admissible.'35 This means that a chain of custody must be estab-
lished for each laboratory sample used and the possibility of any
tampering must be negatived in order to positively identify the
sample as being from the animal species the Commission claims it
is from. This could prove to be difficult because, at the present
time, the Commission does not maintain nearly as tight a system
of security over its laboratory samples as it does over samples
seized from suspected game law violators.136 The laboratory sam-
ples are kept in unlocked storage chambers in the Commission's
laboratory. All members of the laboratory staff have access to
them without asking the senior chemist's permission. 13 7 Conse-
quently, it could be very difficult to prove the proper chain of cus-
tody. Furthermore, as far as negativing the possibility of tampering
is concerned, it is not clear in Nebraska whether a showing that
only laboratory personnel had access to the samples is sufficient to
carry the burden of proof.
The Nebraska case most directly on point is Hershiser v. Chi-
cago B. & Q. Railroad.138 In that case, the Wasserman test for the
presence of syphilis was applied to a sample of the plaintiff's
blood. It appeared from the evidence at trial that from the time
the sample was drawn until the time the test was conducted the
135. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
136. Interview with David W. Oates, Comm'n Senior Chemist (March 10, 1978).
137. Id.
138. 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.W. 177 (1918).
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sample had been stored in the laboratory's ice box. Other people
associated with the doctor who performed the test had access to
the laboratory. The doctor testified that he himself had made no
change in the sample and that to the best of his knowledge, none of
his associates had either.139 Nonetheless, the defendant moved to
have all testimony in regard to the test stricken for the reason that
the possibility of a substitution of blood had not been precluded by
the facts shown.140 The Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged
that "[a] s a general rule, the probability of any tampering with the
objects of such tests should be negatived before evidence [of the
test results] is admitted."' 4 1 It further stated that rather than
showing that the only persons who had access to the laboratory
were the doctor's associates, it would have been better to prove the
sample had been absolutely undisturbed by anyone except the
doctor.142 However, since another test had been made under
proper conditions, with the same result, the court held the admis-
sion of testimony in regard to the first test was nonprejudicial er-
ror.1 4 3 Consequently, it is unclear whether the possibility of
tampering with a sample can be sufficiently negatived by a show-
ing that only laboratory personnel had access to it. There is strong
indication that it cannot be. Because of the evidentiary problems
created by the Commission's present laboratory system of storing
laboratory samples used in the immunodiffusion and immunoelec-
trophoretic techniques, it would be advisable to establish a new
storage system. A system similar to the one used in storing evi-
dentiary samples seized from suspected game law violators should
be sufficient.
The Commission will have a much easier task in establishing
the fact that its laboratory blood, tissue, and antiserum samples
were in such a condition as to produce accurate test results. The
samples are produced by the Commission itself at its laboratory
rather than purchased commercially, as they are by some other
laboratories. 144 This eliminates the question of whether the
purchased samples are what they purport to be. Furthermore, all
the laboratory samples are stored in chambers specially designed
for their continued preservation. 45 Here again, as was true with
samples seized from suspected game law violators, any question
that might possibly be raised in regard to the condition of the labo-
ratory samples should only affect the weight and credibility to be





144. Interview with David W. Oates, Comm'n Senior Chemist (March 10, 1978).
145. Id.
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given the test results. It should have no bearing on the admissibil-
ity of the immunodiffusion and immunoelectrophoretic identifica-
tion results.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once the Commission clears up the problems it presently faces
in establishing the identity and condition of its known laboratory
samples, it would appear that it will have no major problem in per-
suading a Nebraska court to admit into evidence the results of its
two new scientific identification techniques, if challenged by a de-
fense attorney. Although the use of immunodiffusion and immu-
noelectrophoresis for game law enforcement purposes is
somewhat novel, that in itself is not sufficient grounds for denying
admissibility to the Commission's scientific identifications. If
questions arise at trial in regard to the accuracy of the Commis-
sion's identification results, they should only be considered by the
trier of fact in determining the weight to be given the results.
They should not, however, have any effect on the admnissibility of
the two scientific techniques' identification results.
The use of scientific methods and techniques is necessary to
achieve accurate fact-finding. The use of scientific evidence in the
courtroom produces more expeditious handling of cases, just dis-
position of cases, and increased public confidence in the judicial
system. These are all desirable results which can be lost if courts
refuse to admit reliable scientific evidence because it is new and
somewhat unique. The immunodiffusion and immunoelec-
trophoretic blood and tissue identification techniques clearly have
probative value for the courts. If they fail to recognize the identifi-
cation results as admissible evidence, their ability to efficiently ad-
minister justice will be inhibited.
John W. Pharris '78
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